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Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and
inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war-of-attrition
model to guide our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that sta-
bilizations are more likely to occur when times of crisis occur, when new govern-
ments take office, when governments are “strong” (that is, presidential systems
and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the
executive branch faces fewer constraints. The role of external inducements like
IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problems of reverse causality are pos-
sible. [JEL H11, H61, H62]
W
hy do certain countries implement economic reforms relatively promptly
and swiftly, whereas others delay them, letting significant economic costs
accumulate? This issue puzzles economists and policymakers, and it is part of an
even broader question: why do certain societies follow for long periods policies
that are clearly costly and unsustainable? In many ways, this is the key issue at the
core of political economics.1
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The subject of the “political economy of reform” has received much attention.2
The term “reform” generally refers to a major change in policy that goes beyond day-
to-day policy management. Some reforms are stabilizations; others involve structural
changes. A stabilization is normally interpreted as a major fiscal adjustment that sig-
nificantly reduces a large budget deficit and/or stops a large inflation. Often but not
always, large inflations and large deficits go together, especially in developing coun-
tries. Structural reforms may involve liberalization of goods markets, changes in the
regulatory environment, labor market reforms, or trade liberalizations.3
Some of the reasons that reforms are delayed apply to both types of reforms, but
in this paper we focus on stabilizations in Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries and in developing countries. We consider
the model of “war of attrition” applied to delayed reforms by Alesina and Drazen
(1991)4 and derive from it a series of empirical implications that encompass many
of the hypotheses tested in the empirical literature on this topic. We show how
the war-of-attrition model can be a useful tool to guide the empirical analysis on
the political economy of stabilizations. In fact, the war-of-attrition model has two
advantages: it allows the organization into a coherent framework of many empirical
hypotheses investigated in the literature and offers some more, but also it explains
why sometimes the evidence may be murky. We do not present any novel theoreti-
cal result; the contribution of the paper is empirical.
The key assumption of this model is that the political conflict over what type
of stabilization to implement, in particular on the distribution of costs of the adjust-
ment, leads to delays. A stabilization occurs when one of the competing groups
can impose its desired policies on others that have exhausted their ability to resist
the undesired stabilization. The nature of political institutions influences the dis-
tribution of political power between competing social groups, and this is the con-
nection between the model and testable implications on institutional variables we
investigate in this paper.
First of all, the war-of-attrition model is consistent with the “crisis hypothesis”—
namely, with the idea that it is easier to stabilize more decisively in times of crisis
than in times of more moderate economic problems. We find support for this
hypothesis, for both inflation and budget deficits. In addition, and perhaps more
interestingly, we examine under which political conditions a crisis is more likely
to lead to a stabilization. As predicted by the war-of-attrition model, we find that
stabilizations are more likely to happen when a crisis occurs with a “strong” gov-
ernment, which, presumably, can overrule political opposition to policy changes.
For instance, stabilizations are more successful and easier to come by in presi-
dential systems, in systems in which the executive faces fewer institutional veto
2Several influential contributions are in the volume edited by Williamson (1994). Tommasi and Velasco
(1996), Rodrik (1996), and Drazen (2000) have also provided useful surveys of this literature.
3For a recent discussion of the political economy of structural reforms in the labor and product mar-
kets, see Boeri (2005). A special branch of the reform literature analyzes postcommunist transformations,
but, by now, ex-communist countries are very much like other countries; therefore a special treatment of
them does not seem necessary any longer (see Shleifer and Treisman, 2000).
4For extensions, see Drazen and Grilli (1993), Laban and Sturzenegger (1994), Casella and Eichengreen
(1996), and Hsieh (2000).WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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points, in periods of unified government in which the same party holds the execu-
tive and the legislature, and in systems in which the majority of the ruling party
(or parties) is large. We also find that a stabilization is more likely to occur imme-
diately after an election, presumably when the new government enjoys a mandate
and when new elections are a long time away. External inducements, such as IMF
conditionality programs, have at best a moderate effect, even though problems of
reverse causality abound in this paper. Results on stabilizations of budget deficits
and inflation are relatively similar, but we also discuss some small differences. We
should make clear that these results do not imply that certain types of government
are inherently superior to others: the ability to stabilize is only one of the features
that a society may require in a government, but there are certainly others, such as
fairness, responsiveness to changes in society’s preferences, and checks and bal-
ances. Spolaore (2004) and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) have recently dis-
cussed this kind of trade-off in a context related to that of the present paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the war of attrition
model of delayed stabilizations and we derive several empirical implications from
it. In section 3 we review existing evidence on these empirical implications. In sec-
tion 4 we present our data set and the methodology of our tests. In section 5 we test
various implications of the war of attrition model on budget deficits. In section 6
we consider similar evidence on inflation. The last section concludes.
I. Delayed Stabilizations: The War-of-Attrition Model
The Structure of the Model
The model considers an economy that, after a negative permanent shock (not
explained by the model itself), is on an unstable fiscal path—imagine a perma-
nent fall in tax revenues for given tax rates or a permanent increase in spending.
Consider, in particular, an economy running a budget deficit financed in part with
foreign borrowing and in part by printing money, that is, by the inflation tax, which
is especially distortionary.5
A stabilization is an increase in revenues (or a cut in spending, but for the sake
of exposition, we will talk only of increasing revenues and will hold spending con-
stant) so that the debt stops growing and inflation disappears; thus, the budget is
balanced with a noninflation tax such as an income tax (which is assumed to be
less distortionary than inflation), and there is no more external borrowing. The
government continues to pay interest on the accumulated debt, and no default is
allowed. In this economy, a social planner would stabilize immediately because
delaying a stabilization is costly for two reasons: it accumulates the distortionary
costs of inflation and increases the interest burden for the government because
external debt is accumulating.6
5For the generic war-of-attrition model, see Bliss and Nalebuff (1984). The adaptation to a monetary
and fiscal stabilization problem is by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Drazen (2000) offers a simplified expo-
sition of this model.
6As Drazen and Grilli (1993) point out, accumulation of debt is unnecessary as long as the inflation
tax is more distortionary than the income tax.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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Delays in the stabilization emerge from political conflict between two differ-
ent groups in this society (there could be N groups, but we focus on the simpler
case). These could be social groups and could be represented by different political
parties. Each group acts as a single agent, and there is no analysis of its internal
organization. The groups disagree on how to allocate the cost of the stabilization;
each group would like to charge to the other a large fraction of the additional taxes
needed to stabilize the budget. By assumption, one of the groups has to pay more
than half of the costs of stabilization; we will represent this as follows: a share α
with 1⁄2 < α≤1 and α is a given parameter.7
The question is which group will accept to pay a fraction α of the cost of the
stabilization. Each group has a veto power on the stabilization, and each group is
uncertain about the other group’s evaluation of the costs, that is, each group knows
how costly it is for it to wait but does not know how costly it is for the other group
to delay the stabilization.8
The essence of the war of attrition is the following: the passage of time will
reveal which of the two groups is the weaker, that is, which group must pay a higher
cost for waiting. At any given time, a group will choose to wait if the marginal cost
of waiting is lower than the marginal benefit of waiting. The marginal cost is given
by the cost of not having the stabilization for another instant—that is, of living in
an unstable economy for another instant. The marginal benefit is given by the prob-
ability that in the next instant the opponent group concedes, multiplied by the dif-
ference in lifetime utility of the winner group (which pays a fraction (1 −α ) < 1⁄2 of
the stabilization costs) and the utility of the loser (which pays a fraction α > 1⁄2).9
The game ends when, for one of the groups, the marginal benefit becomes less
than the marginal cost, and this will occur sooner for the group with the higher
cost of waiting. So, in the end, the weaker group (that is, the one that suffers more
from the delays) will concede. But resolution is in general not immediate because
the passage of time is needed to reveal which of the groups is the weaker. Delaying
a stabilization is costly for society as a whole, and it is Pareto inferior to immedi-
ate stabilization, but it is individually rational for each of the two groups to wait
because of the potential benefits of being the winner rather than the loser.
Expected Delays: Comparative Statics and Testable Implications
Stabilization is in general delayed.10 It is delayed not only when α=1⁄2; in fact,
if there were no gain in winning or losing, there would be no gain in waiting,
and both groups would “concede” immediately. Also, there would be immediate
7See Hsieh (2000) for an extension of the model on this point.
8More precisely, a cost parameter is drawn from the same well-behaved distribution; one group knows
its own parameter and knows that the other group’s parameter is drawn by the same distribution.
9It is straightforward to compute the lifetime utility of the two groups (winner and loser) because the
model assumes that no more crises will occur and the economy will be in the stable equilibrium forever.
10More precisely, the expected time of a stabilization is positive—that is, a stabilization does not occur
immediately. It would occur immediately if one group had the maximum possible realization of the cost
parameter. Also, the analysis focuses on symmetric equilibria.WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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stabilization with full knowledge of costs: the weaker group would know that in
the end it would be the loser; therefore, it would decide that it may as well con-
cede immediately and save itself the cost of delay.
Thus an unresolved political conflict in which the groups agree to share half
and half and some uncertainty about relative costs are necessary and sufficient
conditions to generate delays. So what makes a stabilization happen?
(1) The passage of time. At some point, one of the groups finds it too costly
to wait, and it concedes, that is, it agrees to pay the fraction α of the costs. In a
symmetric equilibrium, this moment coincides with the one in which one group
realizes that it has a higher cost of waiting than its opponent. Note that nothing
observable may have occurred in that instant; simply, the passage of time may have
resolved the uncertainty about the relative strength (that is, the relative marginal
cost of waiting) of the two groups. The longer an economy remains unstable, the
more likely it is that a stabilization will occur. However, there could be a counter-
vailing effect: in certain cases, societies may develop institutions that reduce the
cost of the economic instability. Consider, for instance, the use of indexation to
reduce the costs of inflation.
(2) Crises. A crisis—namely, an economic downturn—may anticipate the
reforms precisely because the relative costs of waiting and fighting the war tilt
in favor of concession. This is more likely to be the case if the crisis weakens one
group in particular, causing it to recognize its weaker status and to concede quickly.
Drazen and Grilli (1993) show that for this reason a crisis can be welfare improv-
ing. In fact, it reduces welfare directly by worsening the economic situation, but
it leads to an earlier stabilization, which reduces the costs of waiting. If the sec-
ond effect is greater than the first one, a crisis can lead to an increase in aggre-
gate benefits.
(3) The nature of political institutions. In addition to the economic costs of
delaying reforms, there may also be political costs of delays. These are the costs
of blocking the other group’s attempt to impose a stabilization favorable to itself;
blocking may take the form of lobbying or active political participation (for
example, strikes). This interpretation of the costs makes especially clear the con-
nection between stabilizations and the institutional characteristics of the country.
In political systems where the executive has strong powers and cannot be blocked
by the opposition easily, the opposition that does not hold the executive faces
high costs of “fighting the war of attrition.” On the other hand, costs are lower if
the executive can easily be kept in check. Imagine a situation in which one group
solidly controls policymaking and it is very costly or impossible for the opponent
to effectively exercise veto power. In such a situation, a stabilization would occur
very soon (if not immediately) because the group that holds power would impose
it on the other. Therefore, political systems (such as presidential systems with a
powerful executive) that make it difficult for the opposition to veto a policy
should see earlier stabilizations. However, these same systems, precisely because
of the uneven distribution of political power and lack of veto power, may gener-
ate a very uneven distribution of costs of the stabilization. Spolaore (2004) ana-
lyzes the trade-off between early stabilizations and uneven distributions of costs
in a related context.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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(4) Political consolidations and elections. A stabilization may be more likely
to occur after a political consolidation in which one of the two groups becomes
more powerful and makes it impossible (or too costly) for the opponent to veto a
stabilization program. A political consolidation may be the result of an election
in which a weak preexisting government either gains strength or is replaced by
another one with a strong majority or mandate. Thus, stabilizations may be more
likely immediately after elections, precisely because elections may reveal which
groups are stronger. As a result of losing an election, weaker groups may concede
to stronger groups. On the other hand, right before an election both groups have
an incentive to hold on, to see whether the election resolves the uncertainty about
which group is stronger.
(5) External inducements. The nature of the war of attrition and, therefore, the
timing of stabilizations may be affected by external factors. For example, a binding
agreement with an international lending organization like the IMF may increase the
costs of delaying the adjustment, making the resolution of the war occur sooner.
On the other hand, an agreement with the IMF that provides more resources to the
country and does not force the country to commit to any particular set of policies
may delay the stabilization because, in practice, the agreement reduces the cost of
delay by providing easier access to borrowing. Similar considerations apply to for-
eign aid. Certain types of foreign aid, if disbursed in ways that benefit all compet-
ing groups, may delay stabilization by making life easier, a point made by Casella
and Eichengreen (1996). However, certain types of foreign aid may also make one
group stronger and resolve the war of attrition sooner. In many ways, this is the
reverse argument of the crisis hypothesis discussed above.
Before turning to our empirical tests of some of these hypotheses, we briefly
review the existing empirical literature that relates to these arguments.
II. The Empirical Evidence: Review and New Tests
Review of the Existing Literature
The only paper of which we are aware that explicitly tests the war-of-attrition model
of stabilizations is Hamann and Prati (2002) on inflation. However, many other
authors have obtained results more or less directly related to the empirical impli-
cations listed above.
(1) The passage of time. Sometimes a stabilization may occur after several
failures even when nothing observable has changed; in such a case, the passage of
time alone may make the stabilization possible. Interestingly, this hypothesis may
complicate the test of other hypotheses that certain occurrences generate adjust-
ments. Alesina and Drazen (1991) offer a few examples of successful stabiliza-
tions that occurred a few years after identical attempts had failed; in these cases,
the passage of time alone seemed to account for the success.11
11See also Alesina (1988) for a discussion of several historical cases of debt reduction in line with the
war-of-attrition model.WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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Hamann and Prati (2002), in their study of stabilizations of high inflation
(defined as higher than 40 percent per year), do not find that the passage of time
increases the probability that stabilizations will occur. They argue—correctly in
our view—that this may be due to the existence of institutions such as indexation
that may reduce the costs of inflation and therefore prolong the war of attrition.
(2) Crises. Tommasi and Velasco (1996) go as far as saying that the hypothe-
sis that crises lead to stabilizations is part of the “conventional wisdom” (see also
Nelson, 1990; and Williamson, 1994). Considering this hypothesis to be conven-
tional wisdom may be a bit premature, however, given the difficulty of testing it,
for obvious reasons of reverse causality. Without a crisis, there would be no need
for a stabilization. Hence, we could not observe the latter. The authors testing for
this hypothesis are of course aware of this problem and do their best to address it
(see Bruno and Easterly, 1996; and Drazen and Easterly, 2001). Drazen and Easterly
use the concept of “ranking reversal.” They consider countries in the lowest decile
in terms of a certain variable (for example, inflation or budget deficits), and they
test whether the “worst” countries move up in the ranking when they stabilize.
They suggest that the crisis hypothesis holds: the worse a country’s ranking is
before a stabilization, the higher its ranking after. They find evidence that crises
induce ranking reversal for inflation and the black market premium on exchange
rates, but they fail to find evidence for budget deficits and growth. Hamann and
Prati (2002) also offer strong supporting evidence of the crisis hypothesis on infla-
tion. They show that the higher the rate of inflation before the stabilization, the
higher the chance that the stabilization will succeed. Perotti (1999) looks at deficit
reduction policies in OECD countries and finds that more successful fiscal stabi-
lizations occur in “bad times,” that is, in times when the public debt is high and
growing fast. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) also present some evidence consistent
with this hypothesis. Incidentally, because the accumulation of public debt requires
time, this is also an indirect test that the passage of time increases the probability
of a successful fiscal stabilization. Finally, several specific episodes seem to sup-
port the crisis hypothesis, and that explains its popularity. For instance, the Italian
fiscal adjustment of 1992, which was delayed for many years of mounting deficits,
appears strongly motivated by the crisis of that year, which excluded Italy from the
fixed exchange rate area and increased its risk of default.
A related point concerns the fact that adjustments in bad times may actually
bring about an immediate benefit to the economy; these are cases of “expansionary
adjustments.” Evidence that in time of crisis stabilizations can be expansionary
even on impact can be found in Easterly (1996) on inflation and in Perotti (1999)
on budget deficits in OECD countries.12
(3) The nature of political institutions. The issue of how the different political
institutions affect economic outcomes has received much attention; Persson and
Tabellini (2003) offer the broadest and most comprehensive empirical treatment of
the subject even though they do not directly address the issue of stabilizations per se.
12For related literature on expansionary fiscal adjustments, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); Alesina,
Perotti, and Tavares (1998); and Giavazzi and others (2005).Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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For our purposes, a few of their results are particularly relevant. One is that they
find that presidential systems have lower deficits and smaller governments. Also,
among OECD countries, parliamentary systems have larger deficits than majori-
tarian systems, a result also found by Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002)
using different definitions of proportionality. This is related to earlier findings
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989; and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1990) that in
OECD countries coalition governments have larger budget deficits.
More directly related to stabilizations is the result by Hamann and Prati (2002).
They find that the larger the number of institutional constraints on the executive, the
more delayed and less successful the inflation stabilizations are.13 Veiga (2000)
shows that an index of government fragmentation is a good predictor of the delay
of inflation stabilizations. Also, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) show that in
OECD countries coalition governments are less likely to implement successful fis-
cal stabilizations.
Note that this does not mean that certain types of governments are “better”
than others. Governments that stabilize more easily may create other costs for the
economy.14 In addition, governments that stabilize sooner may be those that are
also more able to impose a very uneven distribution of the costs of stabilization.
(4) Political consolidations and elections. The idea that adjustments are imple-
mented at the beginning of an electoral cycle is consistent with two assumptions
that are not mutually exclusive. One is the idea of political consolidations in a war-
of-attrition model, the other is the political business cycles hypothesis. Especially
relevant for our purpose here is the recent literature on political budget cycles,
which investigates whether budget deficits increase before elections. This litera-
ture is rather large, and we cannot review it carefully here.15
Recent results by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen
(2005b), and Shi and Svensson (forthcoming) suggest that political budget cycles
are present in some democracies but not in others: they are common in new
democracies and in those with less freedom of the press. If deficits tend to increase
in election years, obviously this implies that fiscal stabilizations do not occur at
that time. But, as these papers show, political budget cycles are less drawn out than
people perceive. Interestingly, Peltzman (1992) on U.S. states; Alesina, Perotti,
and Tavares (1998) on OECD countries; and Brender and Drazen (2005a) on a vast
sample of both developing and developed countries find that pre-electoral deficits
do not help the incumbent get reelected. Hamann and Prati (2002) show that infla-
tion stabilizations are more likely to occur immediately after a change of leader-
ship, a result consistent with the implications of the war-of-attrition model. Note,
however, that an electoral result that increases the majority advantage of an old
leader may have the same effect in the war-of-attrition model because it could also
be a political consolidation.
13With specific reference to Latin America, Lora (2001) finds inconclusive evidence on this point.
14For instance, Persson and Tabellini (2003) suggest that presidential systems follow more procyclical
fiscal policies.
15For a broad discussion of the literature on political business cycles, see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen
(1997) and Drazen (2000).WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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(5) External inducements. Many types of external (that is, foreign to the coun-
try in crisis) factors can influence the timing of stabilizations. One of these is for-
eign aid. As we discussed above, foreign aid can make the adoption of stabilization
policies more or less likely, depending on how it is disbursed. The empirical liter-
ature on the effect of foreign aid, specifically in creating incentives for good pol-
icy, is vast and very politically charged. One of the reasons for the debate is the
problem of reverse causality: foreign aid should go to countries in trouble, so a
correlation of bad policies and delayed stabilizations with foreign aid can have dif-
ferent causal interpretations. A recent pessimistic view about the effects of foreign
aid is in Easterly (2006), who also provides a good assessment of the literature. It
is fair to say that the evidence that foreign aid has provided good incentives to
adopt good policy is mixed at the very best.
A related question is whether IMF-assisted programs (IMF conditionality)
help. A relatively upbeat assessment is in Ghosh and others (2005), but this liter-
ature, too, is highly charged with debate, somewhat similar to the debate sur-
rounding foreign aid and with a similar problem of direction of causality. Barro
and Lee (2002) provide a critical view on the role of the IMF as promoter of suc-
cessful macroeconomic policies. Easterly (2006) argues that IMF and World Bank
adjustment loans have failed to provide the correct incentives for countries to
implement long-lasting and successful polices.16
However, there is some evidence that at least some forms of external induce-
ments provide the proper incentives for countries to reform successfully. Informal
observations suggest that the inducement to being admitted in the European
Monetary System created incentives for certain countries (especially Italy and
Greece) to quickly reduce their mounting budget deficits.
New Tests
What do we add to this rich literature? First, we consider in a unified and coherent
way how the points addressed above might pertain to both deficits and inflation
in a large sample of countries, including both OECD and developing countries.
Second, we present new tests. In particular, we investigate the interaction between
the crisis and other features of the polity and the economy—that is, a crisis can
generate adjustments, but what makes a crisis more likely to do so? How large
must a crisis be to generate a stabilization? What types of governments react
more quickly to a crisis? And when do they react relative to the electoral cycle?
Can external factors affect the timing? How do crises interact with external
inducements?
Thus, the key parameter of interest for us will be the interaction term between
an indicator of crisis and some institutional variable or some other indicator that
we use to test the implications of the war-of-attrition model as sketched above.
16IMF conditionality may work better if the country feels that it “owns” the program, that is, if the
program is not imposed on the country. For a recent discussion of the political economy of IMF condi-
tionality and its relationship with domestic politics, see Drazen (2002).Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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III. Data and Methodology
Data
This section describes the data we employ in the empirical analysis. We use yearly
data on a large sample of developed and developing countries covering a maxi-
mum time span from 1960 to 2003. We use data on total government deficit as a
share of GDP and inflation (computed from the consumer price index) from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.17
Data on macroeconomic variables (the real per capita GDP and the ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP) are from the Penn World Table 6.1 database, and
data on financial development are from the World Bank database on Financial
Development and Structure.18 Data on IMF programs have been provided to us
directly by the IMF. Finally, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the
World Bank, compiled by Beck and others (2001) and updated in 2004, contains
all the political variables employed in the analysis, except for our measure of insti-
tutional constraints on the executive, which comes from the data set of political
institutions Polity IV. Appendix Table A.1 summarizes definitions and sources of
the political variables we use in the paper.19
On the basis of the (pooled) empirical density of the deficit-GDP ratios and
inflation levels, we define a variable CRISIS, a dummy taking value 1 if the coun-
try is currently in crisis (of fiscal or monetary nature, the relevant definition vary-
ing depending on the left-hand-side variable of interest), zero otherwise. A fiscal
crisis for a country corresponds to a deficit-GDP ratio above the 75th percentile
of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical density (equal to 4.75 percent); similarly, an
inflation crisis corresponds to inflation levels above the empirical 75th percentile
(equal to 14.05 percent). To prevent our results from being driven by outliers, we
have replaced the values in the 1st and in the 99th percentiles of the empirical
distributions of the deficit-GDP ratio and of inflation in the data with their clos-
est values. We have extensively checked (and confirm) that the evidence we
show is not unduly sensitive to the particular values chosen to replace extremely
high and low values in the data, nor to the choice of the threshold we use to
define a crisis.
With regard to form of government, we isolate presidential systems from alter-
native systems. In particular, we redefine the discrete variable SYSTEM in the DPI
database into a presidential system indicator (PRES), which takes value 1 if the
president is elected directly and zero if the president is elected by either the assem-
bly or parliament. This definition corresponds to a rough approximation of the
structure of checks and balances within a political system and pivots around the
17Deficit over GDP for country i at time t is computed by redefining surpluses, variable series 80 . . . ZF.
The consumer price index series are the variable series 64 . . . ZF. We also checked our results employing the
GDP deflator from series 99BIPZF to compute the inflation rate for country i at time t. Results are robust.
18The World Bank database is available online at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/
finstructure/database.htm
19We also refer the reader to the original source book of the DPI database for more information 
on the variables. It can be found at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004_
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separation of powers between the executive body (the president) and the legisla-
tive body (the parliament). A measure of the structure of the electoral law is given
by the variable PROP, which takes value 1 if the electoral rule for the lower house
is a form of proportional representation and zero otherwise (that is, all forms of plu-
rality voting). The effective control of the legislative body by the ruling executive
is summarized by the indicator variable UNIFIED, which takes value 1 if the party
of the executive controls the absolute majority of the legislative and zero otherwise.
We capture the political orientation of the executive with the indicator LEFT, which
is equal to 1 if the executive belongs to a party of the left and zero if the executive
belongs to a right-wing or centrist party. The electoral dummies that indicate if, in a
given year, legislative or presidential elections are held are LEGELEC and EXELEC,
respectively. We employ these variables in our analysis of political cycles together
with another discrete variable, YRCURNT, which counts the number of years left
in the current term. Finally, the variable EXECONST measures the institutional
constraints on the executive. This indicator ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 represent-
ing the fewest executive constraints and 7 representing the most.
Table 1 presents some interesting summary statistics on the frequency of crises
in different political systems. Column 1 shows that deficit crises are distributed fairly
uniformly among political systems, the relative frequency of occurrence being about
0.3 for all of the categories. Thus, deficit crises do not occur especially more often
in one particular type of system than they do in any other. In the case of inflation
Table 1. Relative Frequency of Crises and Reforms
(1) (2)
Deficit Crises Inflation Crises
Presidential systems 0.29 0.37
Parliamentary systems 0.30 0.20
Proportional systems 0.26 0.30
Majoritarian systems 0.30 0.18
Unified governments 0.28 0.32
Divided governments 0.29 0.24
Left governments 0.34 0.28
Right + center governments 0.26 0.30
Legislative elections years 0.33 0.27
No legislative elections years 0.29 0.29
Executive elections years 0.28 0.36
No executive elections years 0.30 0.28
Notes: Deficit crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to or
greater than 4.75 percent, which is the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density. Inflation crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent, which is the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density. Presidential/
parliamentary systems: indicator variable PRES = 1/0. Proportional/majoritarian systems: indicator
variable PROP = 1/0. Unified/divided governments: indicator variable UNIFIED = 1/0. Left/right +
center governments: indicator variable LEFT = 1/0. Legislative elections years/no legislative elec-
tions years: indicator variable LEGELEC = 1/0. Executive elections years/no executive elections
years: indicator variable EXELEC = 1/0. See also Appendix Table A.1.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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(column 2), there is a bit more variation. Presidential systems have the highest fre-
quency of inflation crises (0.37). This is mostly driven by the experience of Latin
America, where many countries have presidential regimes and where inflation has
been traditionally high. We discuss other issues specific to Latin America below.
Table 2 shows the average deficit (column 1) and the average inflation (column 3)
during crises. Columns 2 and 4 report the average response the year after a coun-
try enters a crisis. We consider budget deficits first. The response in presidential
systems is about twice as large as the one in parliamentary systems. Unified
governments react twice as often as divided governments; majoritarian systems
react more often than parliamentary systems. In executive election years, the
deficit reduction is much smaller than in nonexecutive election years. In the case
Table 2. Politics, Deficit, and Inflation Crises—Average Values
Crises Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deficit/GDP ∆(Deficit/GDP) Inflation ∆Inflation
Presidential systems 6.63 −1.82 45.61 −7.06
(0.25) (0.24) (2.50) (1.67)
Parliamentary systems 7.73 −0.69 38.29 −2.12
(0.21) (0.17) (3.01) (2.25)
Proportional systems 8.04 −0.81 49.21 −7.43
(0.25) (0.20) (3.08) (1.99)
Majoritarian systems 6.07 −1.30 27.86 −4.80
(0.25) (0.25) (2.87) (2.98)
Unified governments 7.04 −1.40 40.24 −6.39
(0.25) (0.25) (2.57) (2.05)
Divided governments 7.73 −0.78 47.92 −3.76
(0.23) (0.16) (3.59) (2.00)
Left governments 8.02 −0.85 45.42 −3.28
(0.30) (0.24) (3.75) (2.83)
Right + center governments 7.56 −0.96 51.32 −4.77
(0.27) (0.22) (3.78) (2.10)
Legislative elections years 7.62 −0.92 42.53 −3.42
(0.34) (0.29) (4.24) (2.81)
No legislative elections years 7.04 −1.36 43.41 −6.00
(0.18) (0.17) (2.20) (1.53)
Executive elections years 8.22 −0.17 50.65 −3.59
(0.61) (0.61) (6.87) (3.01)
No executive elections years 7.08 −1.35 42.23 −5.70
(0.17) (0.15) (2.01) (1.47)
Notes: Crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio (inflation rate) is
equal to or greater than 4.75 percent (14.05 percent), which is the value of the 75th percentile of
the deficit-GDP ratio (inflation rate) empirical density. Presidential/parliamentary systems: indi-
cator variable PRES = 1/0. Proportional/majoritarian systems: indicator variable PROP = 1/0. Unified/
divided governments: indicator variable UNIFIED = 1/0. Left/right + center governments: indicator
variable LEFT = 1/0. Legislative elections years/no legislative elections years: indicator variable
LEGELEC = 1/0. Executive elections years/no executive elections years: indicator variable EXELEC =
1/0. See also Appendix Table A.1. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.of inflation, similar results hold, with one interesting exception: the reaction in
proportional electoral systems is stronger than in majoritarian systems. Much of
this impressionistic and preliminary evidence is consistent with the implication
of the war-of-attrition model. We now turn to a more careful statistical analysis
of the data.
Empirical Model: Adjustments and Political Institutions
We now describe our empirical strategy. For country i at time t, let us define the out-
come of interest yit, where y is either the deficit-GDP ratio or inflation. Consider a
horizon of interest for a stabilization of s periods, where s > 0. In the empirical
implementation we typically restrict our attention to four years: s = 1 ,...,4 .  T h e
change in yi over the period [t,t + s] is defined as ∆syit = yi,t+s − yit. The variable
∆syit is the regressor and is determined by the following empirical model:
In equation (1) we indicate the political variable of interest as POLit (averaged
over [t,t + s]) and we define the crisis indicator as CRISISit, setting it equal to 1 in
the fourth quartile of the (pooled) empirical cumulative function of y, as indicated
in equation (2). The specification is completed by a two-way error component in
equation (3), accounting for country-level and year fixed effects. We estimate our
model defined by equations (1)–(3) by ordinary least squares, and we correct the
standard errors for heteroscedasticity.
Notice that in the presence of highly persistent political covariates, such as form 
of government (PRES) or electoral rule (PROP), the average level 
over the adjustment horizon considered is practically constant with respect to t. In
the instance of POLit constant over time, β1 is not identified in equation (1). The
parameter β2 in equation (1) captures the crisis hypothesis—that is, the size of the
adjustment ∆syit should depend negatively on the presence of the crisis. This implies
that β2 < 0. The parameter β3 on the interaction between the crisis dummy and POL
indicates an increase or a reduction of the marginal impact of the crisis on the size
of the adjustment (again, a negative coefficient indicating a larger adjustment),
depending on the specific political feature considered. Different predictions are
associated with different political institutions and we analyze them in Section IV.
Empirical Model: Extensions
Consistency in the estimation of the vector of parameters of interest (β2, β3) is
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error component εit is uncorrelated within and across countries to the covariates
set, ruling out bias owing to omission of relevant variables.20
A straightforward check in this direction is to include time-varying covariates
Xit to the specification. We include in X the natural log of real per capita GDP, trade
volume measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the value of
credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. The latter
variable is one of the measures of depth of financial markets used by Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000). All variables included in X are measured at time t.
Moreover, we also control for time-invariant covariates by expanding equation
(1) with an appropriate set of interactions. In particular, we checked that our
results are not driven by the Latin American countries, and we allow the coeffi-
cients to vary across developed and developing countries.
A final extension of equation (1) consists of relaxing the condition on the defi-
nition of crisis. First, we change the value of τ in equation (2). Second, we estimate
as a robustness check for all specifications in which we use equation (1). Results of
extended versions of our benchmark models on fiscal and inflation stabilizations
are discussed in Sections IV and V, respectively.
IV. Empirical Results: Budget Deficits
In the tables that follow, we present results on budget deficits in panel A and on
inflation in panel B. In many cases, results on inflation are very similar to those
on budget deficits. In Section V, we highlight instances in which the results are dif-
ferent by comparing panel A and panel B of these tables.
Political Systems
This section reports the estimates of specification (1) for form of government
(POL = PRES), executive constraints (POL = EXECONST), unified government
(POL = UNIFIED), and electoral rule (POL = PROP), when the variable of inter-
est yit is the deficit-GDP ratio. The crisis hypothesis implies that β2 < 0. We also
investigate whether stronger governments adjust more swiftly and aggressively
when they are in a crisis. We “proxy” strength of governments with presidential
systems, where the absence of the assembly’s confidence motion insulates the
president from legislative control or where the executive relies on a strong major-
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20This is an issue particularly pressing for the cross-sectional empirical literature on the effects of
political institutions. See the discussions in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and in Acemoglu (2005). Clearly,
misspecification of the interaction term is possible in this panel, but by focusing on the orthogonal compo-
nents across time and countries, the likelihood that our results would be solely driven by omitted variable
bias is smaller than in the cross-section.WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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ity in the legislature. Stronger executives have more flexibility of policy imple-
mentation because they face fewer veto players (that is, low EXECONST) and
have a higher capacity to shift the costs of reform onto their opponents. Hence,
we expect β3 < 0 when considering the interactions involving PRES and CRISIS
and UNIFIED and CRISIS. At the same time, we expect EXECONST and CRISIS
to have a positive interaction, β3 > 0.
The results support these hypotheses. Panel A of Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the
baseline regression (1) for s = 1 in column 1. The coefficient β2 is estimated at
−0.015, −0.04, and −0.016 for PRES, EXECONST, and UNIFIED, respectively
(with corresponding t-statistics of −6.54, −8.78, and −6.85). The estimates of β3 are
−0.019 in Table 3 (with a t-statistic of −5.23), 0.004 in Table 4 (with a t-statistic
of 5.01), and −0.011 in Table 5 (with a t-statistic of −3.25). Given the dichotomous
nature of the regressors—CRISIS, PRES, and UNIFIED—the estimated coefficients
relative to these variables and the interaction terms also correspond to incremental
effects. For example, in Table 3, panel A, β2 =− 0.015 and β3 =− 0.019 indicate an
average deficit cut of 1.5 percentage points of GDP in times of crisis that more than
doubles (the deficit-GDP ratio decreases by an additional 1.9 percentage points of
GDP) in presidential systems. For s=2, 3, and 4, the variable CRISIS tends to induce
Table 3. Stabilizations, Crises, and Forms of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.015 −0.026 −0.032 −0.040
(−6.54)*** (−9.38)*** (−10.74)*** (−12.15)***
CRISIS*PRES −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.013
(−5.23)*** (−4.08)*** (−3.85)*** (−2.52)**
Number of 2,323 2,213 2,103 1,993 
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.037 −0.067 −0.086 −0.110
(−2.24)** (−2.94)*** (−3.43)*** (−4.15)***
CRISIS*PRES −0.079 −0.114 −0.141 −0.137
(−3.11)*** (−3.30)*** (−3.59)*** (−3.40)***
Number of  2,622 2,503 2,387 2,273
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density). In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). PRES = 1 if direct
presidential; 0 if the president is elected either by the assembly or parliament. Country fixed effects and
year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity are
in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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reductions in deficits up to around 4 percentage points of GDP. The estimates of β3
remain negative and significant in Table 3 (POL = PRES) but do not increase in
absolute terms as s increases.
In Table 4, the measure of executive constraints (POL = EXECONST) has a
positive and significant multiplicative effect on the CRISIS dummy at every s.
Moreover, the coefficient β1 is positive and significant at s = 2, 3, and 4.21 Thus,
less constrained governments adjust more substantially, and this is consistent with
our results in Table 3.
In Table 5, we investigate the role of the political variable UNIFIED, which
measures whether the party of the executive controls the absolute majority of
the legislative. The interaction term β3 rapidly loses significance and assumes
21In this instance, it is sensible to discuss the role of β1 because EXECONST presents substantially
higher within-country variation than PRES.
Table 4. Stabilizations, Crises, and Constraints on the Executive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.0413 −0.0463 −0.0548 −0.0568
(−8.78)*** (−8.40)*** (−8.76)*** (−8.89)***
EXECONST 0.0001 0.0013 0.0023 0.0032
(0.24) (1.92)* (3.11)*** (3.99)***
CRISIS* 0.0039 0.0028 0.0030 0.0022
EXECONST (5.01)*** (3.06)*** (2.86)*** (2.09)**
Number of  2,674 2,546 2,423 2,301
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.1017 −0.1594 −0.1569 −0.1701
(−3.65)*** (−4.45)*** (−3.69)*** (−3.54)***
EXECONST 0.0018 0.0030 0.0057 0.0059
(0.62) (0.72) (1.06) (0.91)
CRISIS* 0.0052 0.0089 0.0044 0.0033
EXECONST (0.94) (1.22) (0.53) (0.36)
Number of 2,949 2,812 2,680 2,549 
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density). In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). EXECONST:
institutional constraints on the executive; ∈ [1,7] and increasing in the number of executive constraints.
Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for
heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level;
* 10 percent significance level.the opposite (wrong) sign after three periods. This is countered by a progres-
sive reduction in the coefficient β1, which becomes significant and negative at
s = 2, 3, and 4. This seems to suggest that, despite whether there is a crisis, fis-
cal adjustments are larger in countries with executives who command absolute
majorities.
Finally, Table 6 reports the results on PROP. Estimates of β2 are in line with
those of Tables 3, 4, and 5. Concerning β3, because majoritarian systems tend to
offer larger majority premiums than proportional representation, PROP systems
should be less inclined to stabilize. This would imply that β3 > 0 when consider-
ing the interactions involving PROP. However, the effective composition of the
assembly and not the formal rule for assignment of the seats should matter in
approximating the executive’s strength. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find
weaker results than when we use the indicator UNIFIED. The estimated β3 is posi-
tive (and insignificant) for s = 1 and 2 but becomes negative and significant at s = 4.
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Table 5. Stabilizations, Crises, and Control of the Legislative Body
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.016 −0.029 −0.040 −0.047
(−6.85)*** (−9.24)*** (−10.95)*** (−11.52)***
UNIFIED −0.0001 −0.005 −0.011 −0.013
(−0.22) (−1.99)** (−3.49)*** (−3.81)***
CRISIS* −0.011 −0.006 0.003 0.005
UNIFIED (−3.25)*** (−1.39) (0.69) (0.88)
Number of 2,032 1,909 1,791 1,677 
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.052 −0.094 −0.139 −0.180
(−2.87)*** (−3.78)*** (−4.83)*** (−5.87)***
UNIFIED −0.012 −0.021 −0.032 −0.043
(−1.12) (−1.43) (−1.70)* (−1.97)**
CRISIS* −0.050 −0.064 −0.064 −0.038
UNIFIED (−2.15)** (−1.95)* (−1.73)* (−0.95)
Number of 2,294 2,164 2,038 1,919 
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density). In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). UNIFIED = 1
if the party of the executive controls the absolute majority of the legislature; 0 if otherwise. Country
fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for het-
eroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level; *
10 percent significance level.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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In summary, this section has provided strong evidence, both statistically and eco-
nomically, that crises lead to swifter and more drastic adjustments with “stronger”
governments, that is, in countries in which the executive has fewer constraints, the
government is unified, and the system of government is presidential.
Elections, Timing, and Partisan Orientation
This section reports the estimates of specification (1) for the number of years left
in the current term for the executive (POL = YRCURNT), the timing of legislative
elections (POL = LEGELEC), and the political orientation of the ruling govern-
ment (POL = LEFT). Executive elections are not reported but discussed.
The war-of-attrition model implies that a stabilization should be more likely
to occur after a political consolidation, that is, when one group gains political con-
trol. On the other hand, right before an election the political uncertainty about the
relative power of the competing groups may be at a maximum or, in any case, about
to be resolved. Thus, groups may decide it is worth waiting in the hope of winning
the election. However, it is difficult to distinguish this implication of the war-of-
attrition model from a more traditional one of opportunistic fiscal behavior, that is,
Table 6. Stabilizations, Crises, and Electoral Rules
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.023 −0.034 −0.031 −0.030
(−6.90)*** (−7.96)*** (−7.46)*** (−7.64)***
CRISIS*PROP 0.007 0.005 −0.006 −0.018
(1.60) (1.01) (−1.11) (−3.10)***
Number of 1,707 1,600 1,496 1,394 
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.044 −0.093 −0.124 −0.119
(−1.75)* (−4.62)*** (−6.18)*** (−6.09)***
CRISIS*PROP −0.066 −0.074 −0.091 −0.116
(−1.82)* (−2.31)** (−2.65)*** (−3.30)***
Number of 1,958 1,840 1,725 1,615 
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density). In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). PROP = 1 if
the electoral rule for the Lower House is a form of proportional representation; 0 if otherwise.
Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected
for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance
level; * 10 percent significance level.WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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the idea that governments do not reduce deficits close to elections for fear of los-
ing the election. As we discussed above, there is indeed some evidence that bud-
get deficits tend to increase right before elections, but not in every country and not
all the time—political budget cycles (that is, election-induced deficits) are not the
rule and are not especially rewarding at the polls. However, Table 7 presents results
confirming the hypothesis that stabilizations are more likely to occur at the begin-
ning of a term of office, that is, a long time from future elections. In columns 1–3,
we verify that the number of years left in the current term tends to increase the size
of the adjustment (hence the negative effect) measured as change in deficit-GDP
one year after the crisis (that is, s = 1). The estimated coefficient β1 is −0.002 in
columns 1 and 2 and −0.001 in column 3, with a t-statistic of −3.22, −3.16, and
−1.99, respectively.
Table 7 estimates of β2 are in line with those of Tables 3–6, indicating a sta-
tistically significant reduction of the left-hand-side variable of at least 1.6 percent.
The sign of β3 shows that the response to crisis immediately after elections is ampli-
fied, but the coefficient is not statistically significant and it is small. In columns 4–6,
we consider the effect of legislative elections in a specification of form (1) with
s = 1. Fiscal adjustments are smaller in years of legislative elections but not signif-
icantly so. Only when the interaction term is excluded is the coefficient β1 signifi-
cant at the 10 percent confidence level. Similar (but equally insignificant) results
hold for executive elections.
We conclude this section by focusing on the partisan orientation of the execu-
tive. In panel A of Table 8 we find that, for s = 2, 3, and 4, governments on the left
cut budget deficits more, but they do not do so in times of crisis. This evidence,
which, however, as we discuss below, is not extremely robust to specification checks,
is consistent with the evidence in Ardagna (2004), which shows that, in developed
countries, left-wing governments are more likely to implement fiscal stabilizations
associated with a persistent reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. One possible expla-
nation for this evidence is that left-wing governments face less resistance to reform
than right-wing ones; for example, unions or pensioners—groups that in many coun-
tries influence the implementation of governments’economic policies—can be more
willing to offer their support to left-wing governments and allow them to cut gov-
ernment spending and/or increase tax rates.
Extensions and Sensitivity
We now report the following robustness checks for the benchmark model defined
by equations (1)–(3). First, we add time-varying controls to the right-hand side of
equation (1). Second, we add time-unvarying interactions. Third, we experiment
with different values of τ in equation (2). Fourth, we estimate equation (4), where
the discrete dummy variable CRISIS is replaced by the level of deficit over GDP,
a continuous regressor. Fifth, we allow for nonlinearity in equation (4). Sixth, we
investigate whether the reduction of the deficit-GDP ratio is increasing in its ini-
tial level in a nonlinear way. We consider each type of robustness check separately
for both our analysis of political systems and that of electoral timing. Results are
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With respect to the first three points, all results presented in Tables 3–8 are
robust to the respective changes in specification. More specifically, to control for
omitted variables, we begin by including among the regressors the natural log of
real per capita GDP, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the value of
credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, all dated
at time t. The first two additional regressors are the controls used by Persson and
Tabellini (2003); the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector
divided by GDP is one of the indicators of financial development used by Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000). Our results are virtually unchanged.
Second, we let the coefficients β1, β2, and β3 differ for Latin American countries
and other countries in the sample and for developed and developing countries. In
general, we do not find evidence that one particular group of countries drives the
results presented so far.
Third, we reestimate regressions in Tables 3–8 using two alternative definitions
of CRISIS to check that our results do not hinge on the particular threshold used
Table 8. Stabilizations, Crises, and Governments’ Political Orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.020 −0.028 −0.037 −0.042
(−6.91)*** (−7.65)*** (−9.15)*** (−10.15)***
LEFT −0.001 −0.005 −0.008 −0.011
(−0.35) (−1.78)* (−2.21)** (−2.60)***
CRISIS*LEFT −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.002
(−0.08) (−0.01) (0.04) (−0.38)
Number of 1,509 1,401 1,301 1,208 
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.081 −0.159 −0.216 −0.230
(−3.24)*** (−4.51)*** (−5.61)*** (−5.60)***
LEFT −0.001 −0.004 −0.019 −0.027
(−0.12) (−0.23) (−1.01) (−1.10)
CRISIS*LEFT 0.005 0.045 0.051 0.008
(0.10) (0.68) (0.73) (0.11)
Number of 1,686 1,571 1,464 1,365 
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical
density). In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater than
14.05 percent (i.e., the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). LEFT = 1 if the
executive belongs to a party of the left; 0 if executive belongs to a right-wing or centrist party.
Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected
for heteroscedasticity are in parenthesis. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance
level; * 10 percent significance level.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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to identify periods of large budget deficit. Specifically, we consider the cases in
which a fiscal crisis for a country corresponds to a deficit-GDP ratio above the
60th or 90th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empirical density (equal to 3.11
and 7.95 percent, respectively). Interestingly, consistent with the crisis hypothesis,
we find that the size and significance of the coefficients β2 and β3 increase in the
value of the deficit-GDP ratio above which a country experiences a fiscal crisis.
Fourth, we estimate equation (4), where the dichotomous CRISIS dummy is
replaced by the initial level of deficit-GDP. With respect to PRES and EXECONST,
we find that signs and significance of the parameter vector (β2, β3) concur with
those in Tables 3 and 4. Relative to Table 5 and the role of a unified government
(UNIFIED = 1), the corresponding continuous models report more statistically
significant effects of the expected sign. The same is also true when comparing pro-
portional representation systems in the continuous model. Here, positive estimates
of β3 (for the interaction between the initial deficit ratio and PROP) are significant
at least at the 10 percent level for s = 1 and 2 but become insignificant for s = 3
and 4 and change sign for s = 4. The results on distance from elections are robust.
Regarding the political ideology of the executive, however, we find that the results
in Table 8 for LEFT are not particularly robust. Only for s = 4 do we report a sig-
nificant, negative, but quantitatively small effect of LEFT (β1 =− 0.008).
Fifth, we also allow for nonlinear effects in the continuous specification in
equation (4) by estimating spline regressions that allow the coefficients β2 and β3
to differ for values of the deficit-GDP ratio below and above the 75th percentile of
the deficit-GDP ratio empirical density (equal to 4.75 percent). We find some evi-
dence of a statistically significant incremental effect from the interaction of the
deficit and political variables when the deficit-GDP ratio is greater than 4.75 per-
cent; this confirms our previous results that differences in the forms of government
become particularly important when a country is in a crisis.
Finally, we investigate whether the reduction of the deficit-GDP ratio increases
nonlinearly in its initial level by estimating spline regressions of the change of the
deficit-GDP ratio on its lagged value and allowing the coefficient to differ for
values of the deficit-GDP ratio above the 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of
the deficit-GDP ratio empirical density (equal to 2.27, 4.75, 7.9, and 10.6 percent,
respectively). As expected, the coefficient of the lagged deficit-GDP ratio is negative
and statistically significant at any time horizon, implying that the decrease in the
budget deficit is increasing in the initial value of the deficit-GDP ratio. Moreover,
we find evidence of a statistically significant incremental effect for values of the
initial level of the deficit-GDP larger than 10.6 percent. Note that results in Drazen
and Easterly (2001) support the “crisis induces reforms” hypothesis for the inflation
rate and the black market premium, but not for the budget deficit. Our estimates,
however, suggest that governments are able to sharply cut the budget deficit when
it becomes extremely high.
IMF Conditionality
We now investigate whether agreements with the IMF play any role in budget deficit
stabilizations. We reestimate the benchmark model in equations (1)–(3), but the vari-WHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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able POL now captures countries’participation in IMF programs. We measure coun-
try participation with three different variables: (1) a dummy variable equal to 1 in
every year in which a country is under an IMF agreement for at least six months,
and equal to zero otherwise; (2) a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year in which
the country signs a new loan agreement with the IMF, and equal to zero otherwise;
and (3) a variable measuring for each year the number of months the country is in
an agreement with the IMF. We follow Barro and Lee (2002) and focus only on
short- and medium-term IMF programs, that is, the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA)
and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programs.
In panel A of Table 9, we report the results using the first of the three variables
just described. We do not find consistent evidence that participation in an IMF pro-
gram induces reductions of budget deficits. The coefficients β1 and β3 are statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level only for s = 4. The signs of the coefficients
imply that participation in an IMF program is associated with increases in budget
deficit (β1 > 0); however, in periods of crisis, governments reduce the deficit, and
Table 9. Stabilizations, Crises, and IMF Programs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Deficit/GDP) ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP)  ∆(Deficit/GDP) 
Panel A 1 Year After Crisis 2 Years After Crisis 3 Years After Crisis 4 Years After Crisis
CRISIS −0.023 −0.033 −0.039 −0.043
(−11.85)*** (−14.18)*** (−15.40)*** (−16.11)***
IMFPROGR −0.0001 −0.001 0.003 0.009
(−0.02) (−0.31) (0.66) (2.02)**
CRISIS* −0.006 −0.002 −0.008 −0.020
IMFPROGR (−1.49) (−0.41) (−1.20) (−2.41)**
Number of  3,192 3,076 2,963 2,852
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Inflation 1 Year  ∆Inflation 2 Years  ∆Inflation 3 Years  ∆Inflation 4 Years 
Panel B After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis After Crisis
CRISIS −0.067 −0.099 −0.110 −0.129
(−5.18)*** (−5.42)*** (−4.99)*** (−5.09)***
IMFPROGR 0.013 0.021 0.030 0.027
(1.14) (1.03) (1.18) (0.94)
CRISIS* −0.052 −0.130 −0.211 −0.201
IMFPROGR (−1.54) (−2.32)** (−2.97)*** (−2.50)**
Number of  3,562 3,442 3,325 3,210
observations
Notes: In panel A, crises = country-years observations in which the deficit-GDP ratio is equal to
or greater than 4.75 percent, which is the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit-GDP ratio empir-
ical density. In panel B, crises = country-years observations in which inflation is equal to or greater
than 14.05 percent, which is the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density.
Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected
for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance
level; * 10 percent significance level.Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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the decrease is larger in countries that are under an IMF agreement (β2 < 0, β3 < 0).
This evidence is, however, only suggestive. Given the possible endogeneity of the
variables used to measure participation in IMF programs, we would have to follow
an approach similar to the one in Barro and Lee (2002) to properly estimate the
effect of IMF programs. Although this is beyond the scope of this project (mainly
because of lack of yearly data for valid instruments), nevertheless we run some
instrumental variable regressions. We instrument the IMF program dummy and its
interaction with the variable CRISIS, with first or second lags of these same vari-
ables. When we do so, the qualitative nature of the results does not change, but the
size and significance of the coefficients do. Specifically, both β1 and β3 increase in
absolute value, and the coefficients are now statistically significant at s = 3 and,
in one case, also at s = 2. Finally, when we measure countries’participation with
the other two variables, results (not shown but available upon request) are along
the same lines. The evidence on the effect of IMF programs on budget deficit sta-
bilizations is not clear-cut, and, if anything, our estimates indicate an effect only
a few years after the country has experienced a budget deficit crisis (that is., for
s = 3 and 4). These results are consistent with the analysis of Ghosh and others
(2005), which shows that IMF targets for deficit reductions of countries under IMF
agreements are often and substantially missed. In particular, many countries seem
to be unable to control spending as required by IMF target agreements.
V. Empirical Results: Inflation
This section focuses on adjustments of inflation rates. We follow a structure anal-
ogous to Section IV; estimates of the benchmark model defined by equations
(1)–(3) are in panel B of Tables 3–9. In what follows, we mostly highlight the dif-
ferences from the results on budget deficit.
Political systems seem to play an important role in inflation stabilizations. In
panel B of Table 3, for s = 1, the estimated values for β2 and β3 (−0.037 and −0.079,
respectively) are significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The additional reduc-
tion owing to the form of government more than doubles the crisis coefficient, indi-
cating a very substantial reduction in inflation rates for presidential countries facing
an inflationary crisis. The estimates for s = 2, 3, and 4 are quantitatively higher and
remain statistically significant.
The same results are confirmed for the measure of executive constraints,
EXECONST, in Table 4, where the estimates are again quantitatively substantial,
β2 = 0.0018 and β3 = 0.0052. Table 5 reports the results for UNIFIED. Having a
unified government produces an extra reduction of the inflation rate between 3.8
and 6.4 percentage points in times of crisis. These results are robust to controlling
for initial value of (log) real per capita GDP, trade volume, the measure of depth
of financial markets, and interaction for Latin America, and to the additional spec-
ification effect we described in Section IV. The results of Table 6 investigating the
role of POL = PROP for inflation adjustments are more puzzling. We find evi-
dence that, in times of crisis, proportional systems reduce inflation more during
every period (s = 1, 2, 3, and 4). This seems contrary to the intuition behind the
war-of-attrition model and contrary to previous results concerning the control ofWHO ADJUSTS AND WHEN? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS
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parliament (UNIFIED = 1). However, when controlling for our set of additional
regressors (that is, the natural log of real per capita GDP, the ratio of exports plus
imports to GDP, and the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private
sector divided by GDP), significance at s = 1 and 2 is lost.
In panel B of Table 7, we find no evidence of election timing. There is no
direct effect or interaction effect with CRISIS of the number of years left in cur-
rent term or the legislative election year dummy. Indeed, the signs of the coeffi-
cients are the opposite of those for the budget deficit and generally not significant.
Particularly, the value for the coefficient β1 −0.003 in column 3 is only borderline
significant and has the “wrong” sign in Table 7 and becomes significant in speci-
fication (4). Regarding the political ideology of the executive, Table 8 and results
from the specification (4) indicate no statistically significant difference in LEFT.
Inflation stabilizations do not seem related in any way to the ideological affiliation
of the executive.
Panel B of Table 9 presents results concerning inflationary crises and IMF
program participation. The main difference between fiscal and inflationary crisis
is that IMF programs appear to be more effective in curbing inflation in times of
crisis. At s = 2, 3, and 4, the impact of the interaction term between CRISIS and
IMFPROGR is negative, statistically significant, and quantitatively sizable, rang-
ing from −13 percent at s = 2 to −21.1 percent at s = 3.
VI. Conclusions
The war-of-attrition model does reasonably well as a guideline for testing the tim-
ing of stabilization. In this paper we have presented evidence broadly consistent with
this model on both inflation and budget deficits for a large sample of countries.
Rather than reviewing our results, we conclude by discussing potential extensions.
In this paper, we did not address the question of what causes a crisis. In ongoing
research we are looking at the joint determination of a crisis and the subsequent sta-
bilization by making the event of a crisis endogenous to politico-economic factors.
Second, an important aspect of the war-of-attrition model is that the costs of the
stabilization are distributed unevenly; we did not consider this issue, that is, the
distributional consequences of stabilizations. For example, certain types of gov-
ernment may implement stabilizations more quickly than others but may chose
more unfair distribution of costs. Third, we need to push forward the discussion of
external inducements to stabilizations, a topic that we addressed only imperfectly
in this paper. As argued above, this is an issue in which problems of reverse causal-
ity abound, and one needs to think carefully of how to resolve this. Also, we
looked only at IMF conditionality; one could also consider foreign aid in the same
spirit and test more precisely the implications of the war-of-attrition model regard-
ing when foreign aid can be (counter)productive for stabilizations. Fourth, one
could analyze different types of policy reforms, such as those that we labeled
structural, including labor market reforms, trade liberalizations, and deregulation.
The war-of-attrition model may be useful for these reforms as well, even though
the sense of urgency and crisis may be weaker than in cases of inflation and bud-Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi
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get deficits. Although a hyperinflation or an exploding budget deficit cannot last for
very long, trade restrictions can be in place for a long time, creating costly distor-
tions but not a deep crisis. Finally, we have considered institutions as predetermined
in this paper, but institutions (for example, forms of government) may be endoge-
nous to the same type of socioeconomic conflict that causes crisis and determines
stabilizations. This is a point raised in related literature by Aghion, Alesina, and
Trebbi (2004 and 2005) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). This point also relates to the
“normative” question about institutional choice. We have argued that certain types
of institutions may stabilize more promptly than others. But this does not mean
that these institutions are “superior.” There can be (and in fact there probably is) a
trade-off between promptness in stabilization efforts and other desirable features,
like attention to inequality, control of executive power, and checks and balances.
From a normative standpoint, the choice of institutions requires maximization over
this trade-off.
Table A.1. Definitions of Political Variables
Variable Name in 










constraints; ranges from 
1 (min constraint) to 
7 (max constraint).
1 if in a given year executive
elections are held.
1 if the executive belongs to
a party of the left and 0 if
right-wing or centrist.
1 if in a given year legislative
elections are held.
1 if direct presidential, 0 if
the president is elected by
either the assembly or
parliament.
1 if the electoral rule for the
lower house is a form of
proportional representation
and 0 otherwise.
1 if the party of the executive
controls the absolute
majority of the legislative;
0 otherwise.
Number of years left in the
current term for the
executive.
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